Why sudden death is good public policy

When DrRich decided to become an electrophysiologist over 30 years ago, it was because he wanted to help figure out how to prevent sudden death.  Sudden death from cardiac arrhythmias is estimated to kill over 300,000 Americans each year, and at the time, some of the more recent victims of sudden death had been DrRich’s friends or loved ones. Because cardiac arrhythmias – even the lethal ones – can virtually always be stopped if appropriate interventions are available, these deaths can be prevented, at least in theory. DrRich wanted to help turn the theory into reality.

In 1982, by virtue of being in the right place at the right time rather than by virtue of his own qualities or qualifications, DrRich’s electrophysiology shop at the University of Pittsburgh became the third institution in the world (after Johns Hopkins and Stanford) to gain access to the highly experimental implantable defibrillator. The gradual development of the implantable cardioverter defibrillator (ICD) from a primitive and often dangerous device that was suitable only for the very highest-risk patients, to the finely-tuned life-saving instrument it is today, is an amazing story in itself. Perhaps some day DrRich (who was in the thick of it for two and a half decades) will try to tell it.

But the bottom line is that today we know how to prevent sudden death. And if the evolution of ICDs were permitted to follow the path which is followed by most modern technologies, these devices could, relatively quickly, become small enough, simple enough, safe enough, effective enough, and cheap enough for the kind of widespread usage which would be necessary to actually produce a large reduction in those 300,000 deaths per year. The ICD companies all know how this could be accomplished, and for that matter, so does DrRich.

But alas, this is not going to happen. ICDs will remain extraordinarily complex and expensive devices, which can only be wrestled to ground by highly-trained electrophysiologists (EPs), and which therefore will only be available to a very tiny proportion of the people who could benefit from them. And rather than being celebrated as the typical American success story of harnessing vision, persistence, and innovation to solve a very difficult problem, ICDs instead are widely castigated (by the press, the public, the insurers, the government, and even most doctors) as a symbol of excess, as the poster child for expensive and wasteful medical technology. (And so, when the DOJ goes after ICD companies and the doctors who implant them, the press and the people cheer them on.)

While most EPs and all of the ICD companies refuse to see it, ICDs – a remarkable technology which prevents an all-too-common tragedy – have become an abomination in the eyes of our society.

There are many reasons for this. DrRich will list just three of them, in ascending order of importance.

The third most important reason ICDs are an abomination is: The Toxic Symbiosis Between ICD Companies and Electrophysiologists.

EPs were important during the initial years the ICD was being developed, since expertise regarding complex cardiac arrhythmias had to be translated into engineering language, and then packed into the ICDs, in order for these devices to work the right way. But at some point in the 1990s, ICD companies should have realized that EPs had made their contribution, and were now leading them out on a limb.

Once the fundamental problems in building ICDs were solved, the companies should have been working to make their devices simpler to use, more reliable, and cheaper, so that they could be used by more doctors in more patients. Instead, following MBA Dictum Number One, they “listened to their customers,” the EPs. And the EPs (for whom, like most medical specialists, turf protection is very high up on their priority list), unfailingly counseled the ICD companies to make these devices more and more complex, so that only EPs can understand how to use them. And so, this is what the ICD companies did.

As a result, today’s typical ICD has extra leads (wires) which add appreciably to the difficulty and the risk of implanting these devices, without adding much practical value for most patients; and they have incorporated literally tens of thousands of programming options, ostensibly so that device function can be carefully “tailored” for the individual patient, but which are seldom actually used profitably, and whose chief effect is scaring off non-EPs.

By “listening to their customers,” ICD companies have been led away from simplicity and into unnecessary complexity, and today’s typical ICD is burdened with layers of grotesque tailfins, running lights, oversized tires, and massive engines. In building their vehicles, the ICD companies should have solicited the needs of the typical commuter; instead, they consulted only with monster truck enthusiasts, and so they are producing vehicles that are not suitable for highway use.

The second most important reason ICDs are an abomination is: Government Price Controls (As Usual) Are Keeping Prices High.

The price of ICDs, fundamentally, is determined by Medicare. Way back when ICDs were first approved for use, Medicare determined that a fair price was somewhere in the range of $15,000 – $25,000. This high price was justifiable back in the 1980s, since it cost nearly that much at the time to make one of these things. But the way government price controls seem to operate, ICDs will probably remain in this price range forever.

Now, to be sure, the government does not directly determine what companies get paid for ICDs. Rather, they indirectly determine the price by deciding what hospitals and physicians will be reimbursed for implanting ICDs – and the ICD companies subsequently are paid by the hospital. Those Medicare reimbursement rates apparently vary substantially from region to region and hospital to hospital (who knows how the government determines these things?), and the various rates are not publicly available to DrRich’s knowledge. But ICD manufacturers, at worst, can impute the reimbursement rates by figuring out the top price which specific hospitals are willing to pay them for ICDs (hence the range in prices).

Having determined the top price they can possibly get paid for ICDs, the only logical strategy for manufacturers is to figure out how they can always get paid that top price for every device they sell. They do this by making ICDs specifically aimed at keeping the decision makers happy. And the decision makers, as we have seen, are the EPs.

EPs, having (so far) successfully protected their turf, most often decide which patients get ICDs, and they decide which company’s ICDs to implant. So, to be competitive among their customers, ICD companies must cater to the wants and needs of EPs, and so must produce a steady stream of new, improved ICDs whose novel features are requested by these very high-end, high-maintenance physicians (who again, are dedicated to turf protection through complexity).

Since their product therefore grows more complex with each succeeding generation, in response to the “needs” of their customers, ICD companies have been able to successfully argue to Medicare that ICD reimbursement should be maintained at high levels (and in some cases they have been successful in getting reimbursements to increase even further).

All the ICD manufacturer needs (and wants) to know is: what new geegaws do I need to add to my next generation of ICDs in order to make them even more stupefyingly complex, so as to maintain the loyalty of my EP customers, and to justify high reimbursement rates?

And this is why, despite the fact that ICD technology has been fully mature (says DrRich) for at least a decade now, which in a functional market would cause the price to plummet, the cost of ICDs remains so high. Whatever has developed in the complex interplay between ICD manufacturers, EPs, hospitals and the government, it’s not a functional market.

In fact, there are no market forces at all in play here. Furthermore, there is no evil-doing. The “players” in this scenario – CMS personnel, ICD manufacturers, and EPs – are all simply behaving logically, and are all responding as anyone would to the incentives that have been established within a system which employs government price controlls to keep costs down.

As a result, ICDs remain extraordinarly and unnecessarily expensive.

And the number one reason ICDs are an abomination is: Sudden Death Is Good Public Policy.

A well-known and often-repeated assertion is that 75% (or some similar high proportion) of all healthcare expenditures are consumed during the last six months (or some similar brief interval) of life. Whenever this assertion is made, the clear implication is that some means ought to be found to stop wasting all those healthcare resources, once that six-month clock is found to have started. The debates as to how to go about doing this (since the initiation of the six-month clock can really only be determined retrospectively) often become very nasty, very quickly.

In this light, consider sudden death. Sudden death has the virtue of being completely unexpected – and therefore very cheap. Victims of sudden death will not have spent the last six months of their lives selfishly consuming all our healthcare resources. Likely, they will have spent that time earning money, consuming goods, and paying taxes. These patriots are doing what every healthcare policy expert agrees we should all do – to go directly from being productive citizens to six feet under. For sudden death is free, and if everyone did this we wouldn’t have a healthcare crisis at all.

Furthermore, consider the kind of patient who receives ICDs. Some of these, of course (probably less than 10%) are young individuals with some sort of genetic propensity for sudden, lethal arrhythmias. But by far, most people who get ICDs are older folks, generally in their 60s, who have underlying cardiac disease. These are people who, if their sudden deaths are prevented, will go on consuming large amounts of Medicare dollars for the maintenance of their sundry significant medical conditions, who will go on collecting monthly Social Security payments, and who, when the end finally does come (possibly a decade or more into their ICD-extended life) will do so in the classic American manner – in an ICU, supported by incredibly expensive machines, drugs, and medical professionals. And thus, thanks to their ICDs, 75% of their lifetime healthcare expenditures will also be gobbled up during their last days.

Consider also that there is no constituency for “sudden death.” There is a constituency for breast cancer; a constituency for HIV-AIDS, a constituency for muscular dystrophy; a constituency for autism; and even a constituency for flatulence. But there is no constituency for sudden death. People who die suddenly (all 300,000 of them per year) generally have no idea that they are likely to become victims of arrhythmic death, and don’t care one way or the other if the means are available to prevent this unfortunate event. Until, perhaps, the last five seconds of their life, they are entirely unaware that sudden death is even a remote possibility.

So the path is open to demonize ICDs and those who build or implant them, and to hound them into curtailing – if not stopping entirely – their counterproductive activities.

While ICDs are indeed too expensive and too complex, the chief reason they are an abomination is that they prevent the very kind of death that every health policy expert understands is the ideal. And they convert that ideal death into a years-long orgy of entitlement-consumption, capped off by a typically American, very non-ideal, very expensive kind of death. Small wonder that ICDs are being specifically targeted by the Feds.

Because of what they do, and not because of their cost, the use of ICDs must be curtailed. ICDs would be targeted even if they were as simple, cheap and reliable as DrRich thinks they could and should be.

ICDs would be targeted even if they were FREE.

Heck, the very concept of an ICD is an abomination.

Richard Fogoros is a cardiologist who blogs at The Covert Rationing Blog.  He is the author of Fixing American Healthcare – Wonkonians, Gekkonians, and the Grand Unification Theory of Healthcare.

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  • http://profiles.google.com/kevintkeith Kevin T. Keith

    These are interesting comments, and make a good case that the medical market and implementation framework for ICDs is distorted. But the article is not convincing on its overall theme. As to the technicalities of feature creep in ICDs, I cannot speak with expertise. But taken at face value, the comments about the market forces maintaining this situation make little sense.

    The idea that Medicare price limits maintain an artificially high price for ICDs is absurd. When has Medicare ever been accused of paying doctors or hospitals *too much*? The argument seems to be that Medicare set its reimbursement levels for ICDs when they were still in the developmental phase, and never adjusted them when manufacturing costs were amortized and economies of scale were realized, and so, because Medicare is a price leader in medical markets, prices remain high for all patients everywhere. That seems very unlikely. Medicare reimbursement levels are reviewed regularly, and often pushed downward. Private-insurance reimbursement rates take price cues from Medicare but are usually not equivalent; if there were significant cost savings available, private insurers would be demanding and getting them. The idea that manufacturing costs for these devices have dropped significantly but Medicare insists on paying too much for no reason, while private insurers – who are not bound by Medicare reimbursement rates – simply choose to do so, also for no reason, is nonsensical.

    Furthermore, the entire argument revolves around a central contradiction: that prices would be lower if the market were functioning, and the market for some reason refuses to function even though lower prices are available. Either the market works or it doesn’t. If in fact devices are too expensive because they are unnecessarily complex and cannot be used except by rare and expensive super-specialists, and this constrains their sales (i.e., number of patients treated), then obviously there is an untapped market for devices with simple but sufficient features that can be used by ordinary cardiologists. Some enterprising ICD company could be expected to market a simpler, cheaper device to reap greater profits from sales volume. (EPs are not the only possible “customers”. The fact that EPs want dauntingly complex devices to protect their turf – if it is a fact – does not prevent a company from marketing to non-EPs. The claim about EP turf-protection cannot be an explanation why ICDs are not marketed more broadly.) Yet we are expected to believe that every manufacturer is chasing an exhausted market of small numbers at prohibitive prices while 300,000 or more potential customers a year are ignored. That is not how markets work – whether or not Medicare is subsidizing prices at the high end.

    Finally, the idea that ICD usage is suppressed because “sudden death is good public policy” is both overstated and almost impossible to be true. Sudden deaths may reduce average end-of-life expenditures, but they are not the only way of doing so, and there are obvious reasons why we would want to prevent them anyway, so saying they are “good policy”, when what is meant is that they are cheap, is hyperbolic. And at any rate, they are not “policy” at all. There are no death panels. There is no coordinated plan to push patients into quick deaths by withholding treatments that would let them live long enough to die slowly. There is clearly a situation that results in such lack of treatment, but it is not a policy in any overt sense, and there is no one in whose interests it would be to have such a policy. (It is beneficial in a certain sense to constrain overall healthcare expenditures, but such efforts do not contribute to any individual’s or company’s direct profit. Nobody makes more money through the fact that we spend less money on a certain class of patients. Pundits and policy-makers complain about the high total cost of global healthcare expenditures, but every expenditure is made on an individual basis and there is no benefit to those making or billing for those expenditures to make less of them – this is in fact the reason for the high global total, and the reason why there is not a “policy” to restrict those expenditures in one specific, somewhat arbitrary, arena.) Even if it were a benefit to the nation generally to have fewer intensive end-of-life cases, it would still be in the interests of individual EPs or cardiologists to promote widespread ICD use, and in the interests of intensivists and hospital administrators to encourage more ICU admissions, so “policy” at the clinical level clearly runs in the direction of greater utilization, not lesser.

    It is convenient, and serves a certain political narrative, to blame healthcare inequities on “government interference”. Whether or not that is true in a given case requires a careful look at the details. In general, government-provided or -mandated subsidies for specific interventions commonly have the effect of increasing, not decreasing, availability (consider renal dialysis and birth control as examples), but at any rate the actual facts, not broad ideological perspectives, should govern the analysis. In particular, any claim that “the market” would provide better solutions than current US policy should consider how the market for that intervention is in fact functioning. In this case, the idea that Medicare is somehow forcing manufacturers to maintain artificially high prices while actively refusing to address a vast and completely untapped demand at lower price is both hard to swallow and contrary to basic economic theory. The idea that manufacturers are in thrall to one small class of vocal technical customers, to the point that they somehow cannot serve demand from less-technical users at a lower price point, is similarly unlikely and inexplicable from a market perspective. And the claim that the invisible hand of the market is coordinating global expenditures to make sure that all players make less money is simply incomprehensible as an expression of a supposedly market-oriented perspective.

    Something is clearly going on in the ICD market. But it cannot be any of the things claimed above.

    • qillower

      You are reading the article wrong.  They are price the equipment to high which is common practice with medicare.  If you compare price sheets of medicare and private insurance companies they are in completely different realms but medicare has the helm.

      As for death panels not in name but if medicare wants to deny certain things then medicare can. It all comes down to cost as the population ages and the baby boomers come into play.  If you think its impossible then you need to leave fantasy land and look at the world around you.  Government is supposed to be a neutral body and when it puts it hands in the medical markets place then it can get jealous and has things to loose.

    • natsera

      Seems like you didn’t notice the sarcasm button. Which is how I read it. But I do agree that medical devices are WAY over-priced, and that many who could benefit from vastly improved quality of life are being priced out of the market because they don’t have insurance, or else their insurance or Medicare refuses to cover the item. Personally, I’m receiving good value from my continuous blood glucose monitor, but next year, when I go on Medicare, I’m likely to lose the use of it because Medicare won’t pay, since they consider it cautionary. Yeah, it’s cautionary all right! It cautions me that a low blood sugar is coming, so I can treat it before I end up unconscious on the floor. So, yeah, the guy has a point, it you generalize it to all medical devices.

  • LeoHolmMD

    Doctor:  How do you want to die?

    Patient:  Suddenly, and in my sleep with no pain. You know, drop dead.

    Doctor:  We can fix that.

  • http://twitter.com/Hootsbudy John Ballard

    Great, courageous post. 
    Three cheers from me. We can expect a string of sanctimonious, outraged comments, so I’ll get my kudos in early. 
    And those who want something more to chew on are referred to this from the Times magazine section a couple years ago.

    http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/20/magazine/20pacemaker-t.html?pagewanted=all 

    • Will

       A beautifully written, real-life story in the NYTimes.  Thanks.

  • http://www.facebook.com/people/Claire-Rupert/100001146169242 Claire Rupert

    Not only is this plausible as an explanation for the continuing rise in ICD costs, it translates to the continuing rise in ortho/spine implants and a host of other new costly medical technologies that are believed to be necessary to assure longevity and quality of life. Putting a high-end, pressfit hip replacement in an active and mentally-acute 84 year old could be seen to be reasonable or excessive, because the odds are against that patient reaching a 15 year implant survival rate their same degree of activity. So the question becomes this – are we ready to develop reasonable protocols for demand- matching device selection based on age and activity and return on investment, which relieves physicians of individual accountability for choosing who should receive what? This comes down to tough choices that consider the good of the many over the good of the few. 

  • http://pulse.yahoo.com/_UDJTUH45CFUC6LKCBLB6FGRDKU Diane

    Amen. Though I guess at my age with 2 middle schoolers, I really do want to live a bit longer, perhaps even see my grandchildren. But 30-40 years from now….. Short, sweet, simple. 

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